

THE WERTHEIM LECTURE 1992

LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM

WORLD CAPITALISM
AND THE RISE OF
IDENTITY POLITICS



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LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM:

World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics

In a celebrated essay written in the 1860s, the eminent, liberal-Catholic, Neapolitan-English, politician-historian Lord Acton warned presciently that three powerful and subversive ideas were threatening 'presently existing civilization.' These three ideas were egalitarianism, aimed at the principle of aristocracy; communism (he was thinking of Baboeuf rather than Marx), aimed at the principle of property; and nationalism, or nationality, aimed at the principle of Legitimacy. Of the third he wrote that it was 'the most recent in its appearance, the most attractive at the present time, and the richest in promise of future power.'¹ If we look at the world around us, 130 years later, it looks very much as if Acton was right. Aristocracy has been eliminated as a serious political idea, and adult suffrage has become almost everywhere a present fact or an ineluctable, imminent future.² Communism in all its forms seems headed for the historical scrap-heap. But Legitimacy has also almost everywhere been overthrown, such that the current membership of the United Nations is four times that of the original League of Nations of seven decades ago. One after another the great polyglot empires constructed over hundreds of years have disintegrated—those vast realms once ruled from London, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Lisbon, The Hague, Vienna, Paris, even Addis Ababa. Only the residues of the Celestial Empire still more or less stand, and who will bet any large sum that before too long Tibet and Taiwan, perhaps Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, will not find a seat at the U.N.? It is also quite easy to envisage an independent East Timor, Puerto Rico, Kurdistan, or Kosovo up ahead. Woodrow Wilson seems to have been a surer prophet than Lenin, even though the two heroes had so much otherwise in common.

Yet at the same time as this enormous process of disintegration, which of course is also a process of liberation, the world has become ever more tightly integrated into a single capitalist economy—one in which, in our epoch, billions of dollars can be sped almost instantaneously around the globe at the pressing of a computer key. How is this paradoxical double

movement of integration and disintegration to be grasped? Are these forces in contradiction or merely obverse faces of a single historical process? Furthermore, is capitalism, with its habitual restlessness, producing new forms of nationalism?

* * * * *

A good starting-point for exploring these questions is a pair of further passages in Acton's essay. The first is actually an excerpt from a sermon of the great seventeenth-century clerical orator Bossuet, which our historian mentions with approbation:

La société humaine demande qu'on aime la terre où l'on habite ensemble, ou la regarde comme une mère et une nourrice commune. Les hommes en effect se sentent liés par quelque chose de fort, lorsqu'ils songent, que la même terre qui les a portés et nourris étants vivants, les recevra dans son sein quand ils seront morts.

The second is Acton's own aphorism that 'exile is the nursery of nationality.'³

Acton was attempting to draw a contrast between two types of political loyalty, one fully compatible with Legitimacy, the other profoundly inimical to it (we might gloss these as 'patriotism' and 'nationalism'). For Bossuet did not speak of France (let alone of the French), but rather of a general social condition in which human beings feel themselves powerfully connected together by whatever mother-terrain has nourished them, and in whose bosom—so they dream—they will attain their final rest. It seemed to him absolutely normal that people would dream of dying exactly where they were born and raised. This immobility, contained at the limit by the involuntary, fatal moments of birth and death, aligned itself with the social axioms of feudal society: that it was built as a God-given, unchangeable hierarchy. Combined with a profound attachment to local soil, this made possible the sedate and stately agglomeration of hundreds of such communities into the huge, ramshackle imperia of Legitimacy, and, where necessary, their detachment to other imperia through dynastic marriages, diplomacy, and war.⁴ Bossuet's focus was thus on *heimat*, or perhaps better *patria*, the wonderful Iberian word that can gently stretch from 'home-village,' through 'home-town' and 'home-region,' on to 'home-country.'

By contrast, Acton believed, 'nationality' arose from exile, when men could no longer easily dream of returning to the nourishing bosom that had given them birth. It is quite likely that what the liberal historian had mainly in

mind were the great nationalist leaders of his own era—Mazzini, Garibaldi, Kossuth, and so on—many of whom, for obvious political reasons, lived for long periods outside their *heimat* and sometimes died there. But his acute instincts led him in the right direction: he would not have been in the least surprised that the first explicitly Indonesian-nationalist organization, the Perhimpunan Indonesia, was so established (in 1922) half a globe away from the Netherlands Indies.

What Acton did not note, however, was that Bossuet was already an anachronism, for he was born in 1627, seven years after the Puritan Pilgrim Fathers had landed at Plymouth Rock, and over a century after the Catholic Hernán Cortés had stormed the fabled capital of Moctezuma. From the later sixteenth century on, millions of at least nominally free Europeans, and millions more enslaved Africans, went 'into exile,' as it were, across the Atlantic. These migrations, which had no historical precedent in their scale and distance, were only made possible by feudalism's nemesis: capitalism. Largely private-enterprise investors built the complex seaworthy transoceanic ships that physically moved these millions of bodies; and they were guided by the compass, the sextant, the Mercatorian map, and all the cumulative knowledge stored, and massively disseminated, in the millions of books created after 1453 by print-capitalism.

What sense was made of these extraordinary displacements? We can observe a strikingly parallel movement in the conceptions that arose both in the abandoned metropolises and in the new colonies. In Lisbon and Madrid were invented the 'crioulo' and the 'criollo', in London the 'colonial.' These terms did not spring from any clear *heimat*-like native soil, but implied a certain kind of human being, who could come from almost anywhere except the real *heimat*: a non-Spanish Spaniard, an Englishman who had never been in England.⁵ A sort of dubious, quasi-biological, displaced identity. But one can observe something quite similar developing in the colonies. Take, for example, the immensely popular account (first published in 1682) by Mary Rowlandson, of her brief captivity at the hands of 'Indians' (actually Algonquins).⁶ For she described how 'the Indians quickly spread themselves over the deserted English fields,' how she noticed 'a place where English cattle had been,' and how terrible she found 'the hideous insulting and triumphing there was over some Englishmen's scalps they had taken (as their manner is).' Yet it was only in Massachusetts that she could imagine before her gaze 'English' fields and 'English' cattle; and they were so imagined because she felt that they were emanations of an ineradicable 'Englishness' deep down inside her and

inside her wretched scalped companions. Again a sort of quasi-biological, displaced identity.

It took several generations before this 'Englishness,' gradually attached to what was becoming a real *heimat* or *patria*, could be transformed into 'American-ness.'⁷ The 1776 Declaration of Independence still gave no general name to those declaring their independence. A similar slow process was also at work in the Spanish Americas, as has been beautifully demonstrated in a recent book by David Brading, who notes that already in the seventeenth century some *criollo* intellectuals were seeking ancestors among Incan royalty as well as among Iberian conquistadors.⁸ Once the transformation occurred, the stage was set for the explosive emergence of the world's first nationalist movements and nation-states.⁹ Out of this transformation came also a fundamental restructuring of social-political categories, best exemplified by San Martín's historic proclamation that 'in the future the aborigines shall not be called Indians or natives; they are children and citizens of Peru and *they shall be known as Peruvians*.'¹⁰ In this *heimat*-laden formulation the ghost of Bossuet peeps out from behind the creole, liberal revolutionary. In Protestant North America, with its aversion to miscegenation, and its genocidal policies towards the indigenous populations, nothing quite comparable occurred, though we can detect a certain echo in James Fenimore Cooper's hugely popular, nationalist Leatherstocking novels of the 1830s and 1840s where the 'Indians' of the 1760s are retroactively classified into 'good,' 'American' figures (such as Natty Bumppo's soul-mate Chingachgook) and 'devilish,' i.e., those allied with the French and George III!

It was of great historical importance that the exiles did eventually make their place of exile a *heimat*, and that this attachment produced those classical nationalist movements which found their final political form in the world's first cluster of true nation-states; and that, however turbulent their domestic lives, these states kept their boundaries more or less unchanged up till our own era. For one important aspect of this sedimentation was a reintegration of personal sentiment with public, civic ideology. All the new states, except Brazil up to 1889, were in principle constitutional republics, in whose politics citizens were to accept responsibilities and duties because of their attachments both to terrain and to community. One can view this as a sort of odd updating of Bossuet, in a nationalist mode: the assumption now was that one was born in the *terre nourrice* of Chile or Mexico and would die there, and that this bond of attachment would express itself in political participation, and political accountability, at ... home.

Back across the Atlantic, displacements of a different kind were helping to create Acton's specter. In the present context, two are of prime importance. First were the huge migrations of peasants and farm laborers into urban centers as the Industrial Revolution spread and deepened. The world that Engels observed in Manchester was in its own way as new as the New World, and no less drastic an exiling than that of the Pilgrim Fathers.¹¹ From the viewpoint of London or Paris, the migrations were, of course, 'domestic,' within the political ambience of the states of the United Kingdom and of France. (Yet Disraeli, observing the mid-century rise of the working class, could speak of 'two nations' within Great Britain.) But from the perspective of the migrants themselves, they were being irreversibly torn out of their ancient habitats. When Thomas Gray published (in 1750) his celebrated poem 'Elegy in a Country Churchyard,' he still conjured up a Bossuetian cemetery where 'each in his narrow cell forever laid/ The rude forefathers of the hamlet sleep.' But within a half century, the descendants of these forefathers were being buried in slums or the purlieux of novel factories and mines.

Second was, in many places, the exiling effect of the dynastic states' nineteenth-century programs for centralization and development through the massive expansion of standardized school-systems and bureaucratic publishing. For a singular effect of these programs was the elevation of a particular vernacular, or dialect of a vernacular, into a new language of power and social ambition. Where, as in England, a single vernacular had long prevailed, with marked *heimat* variations (such that Northumberland lords and peasants spoke more or less the same way), the nineteenth century created a 'King's English,' above all the rest, into which all upper classes were gradually trained. 'Regional' dialects thus lost caste and increasingly marked class as much as locale. Where, as in the Habsburg realms, no such vernacular prevailed, the attempt to spread German had comparable consequences. In all cases, the penetrating thrust of the developmental state was making people of many different kinds self-conscious about their linguistic practices and the political consequences of those practices. Quite often the real effect was a kind of 'internal' exile: the corollary of the non-Spanish Spanish creole was thus the non-German German or the non-Hungarian Hungarian. As in the Americas, a kind of 'negative identity' was coming into existence, again quasi-biological in character. Out of these estrangements came violent social and political struggles which, especially in the polyglot realms of continental Europe, produced the nationalist movements that, in the aftermath of World War I, engendered a profoundly new map of the West.

This era today stays in our memories as that of the founding of the League of Nations—a recognition that by 1918 the nation-state had become the internationally legitimate form of polity—and of Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points.¹² At that time, the doctrine of self-determination seemed (variously) to be pleasantly just or dangerously subversive; but we can see today that its assumptions were still significantly Bossuetist and its programmatic implications nineteenth-century-conservative. For it took *heimat* and habitat for granted: Europe consisted of a scattergram of bounded, immobile, 'national communities,' around which ingenious map-lines could be drawn to make possible new, autonomous, nation-states.¹³ Menacingly 'floating' identities could thereby be republicanly regrounded in novel *heimats*. Czechs would now be born and die in Czechoslovakia, Poles in their very own Poland. Cultural life and political allegiance would be stably coaligned.

In the colonial domains outside Europe the same logic was—consciously or unconsciously, unwillingly or with enthusiasm—pursued. Modern, bounded state-terrains had been Mercatorianly mapped, and more or less effectively policed, as it were only awaiting appropriate inhabitants. Here, seen from a certain perspective, colonialism seemed like a stutterer haunted by a nightmare. Stutterer because by its very nature it could not name such inhabitants. No better example is afforded than the Philippines, which by the end of Spanish rule had been imagined for already 350 years as—*qua terre nourrice*—Las Filipinas. But Filipino? Simply the scornful metropolitan name for the tiny stratum of local creoles: in Las Filipinas, yes, but alongside far more numerous *peninsulares*, *mestizos*, *chinos*, and *indios*. Not the general name for the whole people of the patria, until the revolutionaries of the 1890s, who eventually included members of all the above categories, selfwilled themselves into a common Filipino-ness. Colonialism was also nightmare-haunted, because one can plausibly argue, on the evidence, that it dreamed of incipient nationalisms before nationalists themselves came into historical existence.¹⁴ From this point on, as the old republican-American model had originally implied, mapped Mali would have to find its Malians, mapped Ceylon its Ceylonese, mapped Papua-New Guinea its Papua-New Guineans. Not by any means always with total success.

Yet in the nineteenth century there were already signs that the ideal alignment of *heimat*, identity and republican polity was problematic. These signs were visible even in the United States, where between 1820 and 1920 something like 35,500,000 people (an average of about 355,000 a year)

immigrated, overwhelmingly from Europe. Although the American state was firmly in place, and it made energetic and largely successful efforts to turn these swarms into Americans, there were plenty of Mary Rowlandsons among them. The newcomers frequently settled in solidary communities, produced newspapers in the old vernaculars, taught their children the old-time religion, and took a very active interest in the political fate of their '*land van herkomst*,' to borrow from the Indies creole Du Perron. Yet in those days, distances were long enough, communications were slow enough, and America was politically attractive enough, that these interests had only occasional and spasmodic political effect in the Old Countries. The key thing, however, was that these emigré communities were typically close enough, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, to the Old Countries that their vicarious participation in those countries' politics were still more or less 'natural' extensions of those politics, while attachment to the New Countries was becoming hopefully real and solid.

* * * * *

Since World War II, however, and with increasing speed, many of the assumptions of San Martín and Woodrow Wilson have been called into question—once again by capitalism. The two crucial axes of capitalism's thrusts seem to me to be in transportation and in communications. With regard to transportation, the emergence of relatively cheap aeroplane flights has been decisive, though road transport by bus and truck has also developed extremely quickly. Statistics on admission of *non-immigrant* aliens to the United States dramatically demonstrate this revolution:¹⁵

1941–50	2,461,359
1951–60	7,113,023
1961–70	24,107,224
1971–79	61,642,389

On the communication side there has been the new availability of cheap telephone, telex, and most recently, fax facilities, the rapid spread of inter-continental computer networks, and the proliferation of videotape technologies.

These developments have had extraordinary effects on international labor markets, on transcontinental migration, and on conceptions of identity, precisely because they are so tightly linked to the changing global distribution of wealth and resources. As things stand today, less than 25% of

the world's population appropriates 85% of world income, and the gap between rich and poor is steadily increasing. Between 1965 and 1990 the difference between living standards in Europe and India and China increased from a ratio of 40:1 up to 70:1. In the 1980s, over 800,000,000 people—more than the populations of the US, Japan, and the EC combined—became yet more grindingly poor, and one out of three children went hungry.¹⁶ But this inequality and misery is in all senses 'closer' to privilege and wealth than ever before in human history. Hence a tidal wave of migration in a direction rather different from the nineteenth century when it moved (in part) to peripheries in the Americas, South Africa, and the Antipodes: for now it moves inwards towards the metropolitan cores. Again, statistics from the United States are suggestive. In the era of highest immigration between 1840 and 1930, total immigration (primarily from Europe) amounted to about 37,500,000 persons, or about 416,000 per annum on average. In the 1970s, it was close to 500,000, and in the 1980s almost 740,000, higher than in any previous decade except for 1901–1910.¹⁷ Furthermore, the proportion coming from the Third World was over eighty percent. But these days, the situation of the United States is being replicated in various degrees in all the countries of the EC, and even in Japan. And the collapse of Stalin's Empire will surely in the coming decade bring still further mass migrations from Eastern Europe. The truth is that even the most menial occupations in the zone of the rich, with its extensive social support systems, offer a level of security and health attainable only by the privileged in the *heimats* from which the migrants come.¹⁸

Capitalism has also, however, profoundly changed the subjective experience and political significance of migration, by comparison with the nineteenth century. The Filipino maid in Milan and the Tamil busdriver in Toronto are only a few sky-hours away from the *land van herkomst*, so that the possibility of frequent return in a pattern of circulatory migration is there before their eyes. They can find ways to speak to the relatives on the telephone, communicate by fax, send money by telex, and receive photos and videos, all in the twinkling of an electronic eye. The mediated imagery of 'home' is always with them.

Characteristic of our time is the famous photograph of a miserable Peloponnesian gastarbeiter sitting in his dingy little room in—perhaps Stuttgart? His grandfather in Baltimore would have had as humble decorations sepia photos of his deceased parents, left behind in Peloponnesian graves, or religious pictures reminding him of his relationship to the Almighty.

But he himself has on the wall a handsome Lufthansa travel poster of the Parthenon, with a German-language subscription inviting him to take a 'sunny holiday' in Greece. It is his choice, not Lufthansa's. The Parthenon, which he may well never have seen with his own eyes, is not a private family memory, but a mass-produced sign for a 'Greek identity' which only Stuttgart has encouraged him to assume.

Furthermore, a good deal of the nineteenth-century migrations took place in an epoch in which the nation-state was not yet the international norm. One was still escaping from the great dynastic states (which were not primarily defined in either national or ethnic terms) towards still new, still labor-scarce republics in which one could aspire to become a free citizen. Today, however, every migrant comes from a nation-state of some sort, and carries with her the passport which is his international identity card. Moreover, she is moving into densely populated, long-settled terrains where, as time has passed, especially after World War I, more and more people define themselves in national vocabularies. One crucial outcome of this process has been to juxtapose, in metropolitan nation-states, multiple nationalities in the modern sense. The effects have been spectacularly visible, if in contrary directions.

On the one hand, sometimes still fragile European notions of nationality (in the classical sense, tied to political participation and territorial loyalty) have tended to become ethnicized. One hears people in the United Kingdom saying, in effect, of the children of Jamaican immigrants: 'Yes, they live here, they were even born here, they work here, they vote here, and they will be cremated here, but they are not, can not, and never will be "really" English. Why don't they go back to their own countries [nation-states]?' Alongside the National Front's 'real' English are emerging Le Pen's 'real' French and the skinheads' 'real Germans,' for whom the conceptions of 'Bengali-English,' 'Tunisian-French,' or 'Turkish-Germans' are absurd and odious. On the other hand, in the face of this self-ethnicization, the migrants find it painful to accept themselves as hyphenated persons. If they are politically marginalized and economically subordinated in the metropolises where nonetheless they try their best to remain, for a hundred practical reasons, their emotional life and political psychology often remains nostalgically orientated towards a *heimat* which, thanks to capitalism and late-century technologies, retains a powerful daily grip over them.

It would be unwise, in attempting to gauge the longer meaning of the transformations we are watching, to overlook the extent to which the

ethnicization of politics is forwarded by two other visible processes—one most visible in the United States, the other in Europe.

The first is the extraordinary, and I think, irreversible decline of the Bosuetian family. In the United States today, over half of all marriages end in divorce, whereas when I first went to study in America at the very end of the 1950s Reno was still famous as the single place where a divorce could be quite easily obtained. The percentage of babies born to never-married mothers has climbed from 4.2% in 1960 to 30.6% (almost one in three) in 1990.¹⁹ Care of the elderly has increasingly been left to institutions outside the family, and it is quite rare now for grandchildren and grandparents to live in the same neighborhood, let alone the same household. If the old are not cremated when they die, their tombs lie next to those of strangers, and their descendants often have only the dimmest idea of their location. Hardest hit, for special reasons, have been the families of 'Black Americans.' Hence one should not be surprised that it was a 'Black American,' Alex Haley, who pioneered in 1976 the popularization of an imagined *family* history stretching back into West Africa, which was deliberately designed to represent the *general* ethnohistory of Afro-Americans. What is still more interesting, however, is that *Roots*, turned into a TV miniseries in January 1977, secured the largest-ever viewing American public for a serious program: the final episode was seen by over 36,000,000 households, perhaps 150,000,000 people out of a total population of about 210,000,000. There can be no doubt that this interest reflected a wide anxiety about 'roots' among a heterogeneous, increasingly rootless 'white' population. The current impulse towards 'multiculturalism' in schools and universities derives in part from the same anxiety, and produces an enormous variety (serious and demagogic) of ethnohistories. In turn, this phenomenon should be read in tandem with the secular decline in voting in American elections: in the 1990 elections barely 36% of eligible voters bothered to cast a ballot. The implication is that the national institutions and national identity forged during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries no longer have their old commanding power. Hence the emphasis has been shifting from, say, *Irish-American* to *Irish-American*.

But this 'Irishness' has a peculiar contemporary character, which forms an odd counterpoint to the 'Filipinoness' observable on Hong Kong Sundays when thousands of Filipino domestic servants and manual laborers gather along the waterfronts. For the typical 'Irishman' in Boston speaks no Gaelic, knows no Irish literature, plays no Irish games, pays no Irish taxes, serves in no Irish army, knows Ireland only from movies and from

holidays in the Ould Sod, and does not vote in elections to the Dail. But he regards himself as Irish to his core, and imagines 'Irish' in his own self-image.²⁰

In Europe, meanwhile, the rise of the European Community has been slowly undermining the classical nation-state from another direction—as it were from above. Economic integration has proceeded very rapidly, but without, it seems to me, a comparable political integration at either the institutional or symbolic-affective levels. Neither Brussels nor Strasbourg command much affection, attachment, or admiration. Will it really be possible to imagine oneself *politically* as a 'European,' in the way that it was for long possible to imagine oneself as an 'American'? If not, does this not point towards an ethnicization of existing nationalities, especially if, as is already happening, the Common Market itself encourages vast intra-European migrations?

Let me conclude by turning to some immediate political implications of the changes I have been trying to sketch out. I recently had a long talk with an elderly, very gentlemanly professor at the University of Indiana. He has been for years a naturalized American of the old school, though he is Sikh by religion, and Indian by origin. He described for me, with real horror, an acquaintance of his, long resident in Toronto: a middle-aged man from the Punjab who is a successful businessman, and a Canadian citizen, but who is also a fanatical supporter of the movement for Khalistan. This acquaintance provides, sub rosa, substantial sums to the Khalistan movement in India, sums which, he is quite aware, are used to purchase guns, grenades, and bombs on the international arms market. He is enormously enthusiastic about the sacrifices of young Sikh activists as well as about their terroristic campaigns against non-Sikhs in the Punjab. But he also informed my friend that one reason for living in quiet Toronto is to ensure that his own teenage sons remain safe, and assured of successful commercial futures. He does not participate substantially in Canadian political life: instead he lives, through E-mail, by long-distance nationalism. Canada indeed, by its profound indifference to him and to his fellows, encourages him to Sikhify himself, and to live out a suburban dream-politics of his own. His political participation is directed towards an imagined *heimat* in which he does not intend to live, where he pays no taxes, where he cannot be arrested, where he will not be brought before the courts—and where he does not vote: in effect, a politics without responsibility or accountability. Yet it is just this kind of politics, with its ersatz aura of drama, sacrifice, violence, speed, secrecy, heroism and conspiracy, that

contributes so substantially to making 'being Sikh' in Toronto a serious affair. Nor, it should be added, does the existence of such 'true Sikhs,' in a multifarious world-wide diaspora, escape the attention of extremist Khalistanis in the Punjab and of their emissaries overseas. Indeed, they spend much effort to exploit the identity-crises, the uneasy consciences, the ambition, and the economic success of our Toronto Sikh and his like, for their own political purposes.

These Sikhs are, of course, only partially emblematic. We are aware of the role of German and Australian 'Croats' in speeding the violent collapse of Yugoslavia; of British and Canadian 'Tamils' in supporting the murderous Tigers of Jaffna; of Massachusetts 'Irish' in aid of the IRA; of segments of American Jewry behind right-wing extremism in Israel. But there are millions of other long-distance ethno-nationalists who are by no means necessarily committed to fanaticism and violence. Filipinos, Khmer, and Vietnamese in California, Algerians and Moroccans in the Midi, Ukrainians in Ontario, Cubans in Miami, Albanians in Ravenna, and so forth. But, in different degrees, they share something with the extremists: they live their real politics long-distance, without accountability. Not, like Kossuth and Mazzini, true exiles awaiting the circumstances of their triumphal return to the heimat, but émigrés who have no serious intention of going back to a home, which, as time passes, more and more serves as a phantom bedrock for an embattled metropolitan ethnic identity. For the reason I have outlined above, it is quite unlikely that we are observing here a transitional phenomenon—such that a generation hence these Algerians, Tamils, Turks, and Vietnamese will have been turned into Frenchmen, Australians, Germans and Americans. In this sense, the long-settled Irish and Jews of the United States in the 1980s serve as an unsettling portent. Fin-de-siècle world-capitalism seems to be producing a new mutation of Acton's 'nationality.'

Notes

1. Lord Acton, *Essays in the Liberal Interpretation of History* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chapter V, p. 134.
2. This does not mean that fraudulent elections are not widespread; but such frauds would not be necessary if elections had not become signs of modernity and civilization, even in societies such as Islamic Iran, where much ado is made of rejecting 'Western' political values. Even Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are headed down the electoral road.
3. Acton, *Essays*, pp. 154 and 146. The Bossuet quotation is drawn from the text 'Politique tirée de l'Écriture Sainte,' in his *Oeuvres*, x, p. 317.
4. Note the famous passage in *King Richard II*, Act 2, Scene 1, which is so often quoted to claim an early nationalism for Shakespeare: 'This royal seat of Kings, this sceptred isle/ This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars/ This other-Eden, demi-paradise. . . This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.' Yet, aside from Mars and some kings, this demi-paradise has no visible inhabitants, certainly not a jumble of Scots, Welsh, English, and Cornish, many of whom could not have understood each other's speech.
5. Herder and Rousseau were influential articulators of the belief that climate and environment were profoundly constitutive of the character of different peoples. Vulgar variations of this idea attributed severe 'degenerative' effects to the trans-Atlantic ecologies. For further elaboration, see chapter 4 of my *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), especially at p. 60.
6. *Narrative of the Captivity and Removes of Mrs. Rowlandson among the Indians*. It is noteworthy that her text was published in London before it was in the colonies. I owe the references to a manuscript chapter of a forthcoming book by Nancy Armstrong.
7. In this process, print-capitalism was decisive. In the Thirteen Colonies of the seventeenth century printing scarcely existed. But between 1691 and 1820, no less than 2,120 'newspapers' were published, of which 461 lasted more than a decade. See Lucien Fèbvre and Henri-Jean Martin, *The Coming of the Book. The Impact of Printing, 1450-1800* (London: Verso, 1976), pp. 208-11.
8. David A. Brading, *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
9. The argument is more fully developed in chapters 3 and 4 of *Imagined Communities*.
10. John Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 276. Emphasis added.
11. See the powerful theoretical analysis in Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), especially chapters 2 and 3. The 'anthropological' locus classicus is, of course, Edward Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (London: Gollancz, 1963).
12. Wilson was born only twenty-two years after Acton. How History was speeding up its stride by the end of the 19th century can be seen from the total opposition of their conceptions of Legitimacy.

13. At first sight, such assumptions seem especially curious in the mind of the President of a 'nation of immigration,' which was absorbing hundreds of thousands of European immigrants every year. But Wilson had the inestimable advantage of being completely innocent of anything but book-knowledge about distant Europe.
14. The argument here is abbreviated from chapter 10 of *Imagined Communities*.
15. *The 1987 Information Please Almanac* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), p. 787.
16. See Perry Anderson, *A Zone of Engagement* (London: Verso, 1992), p. 353, and the sources there cited.
17. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1992* (New York: Pharos, 1992), p. 137.
18. Note the emphasis on economic-driven migration here. There are in addition at least 25 million political refugees living mostly in squalid, 'temporary' quarters, outside their homelands.
19. According to the Bureau of the Census as cited in *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1992*, p. 944.
20. Hence the grimly amusing struggle, growing more intense each year, over the annual St. Patrick Day's parade in New York—a parade meant to 'exhibit' Irishness to America (and by satellite TV to Ireland). Since 1990, the efforts of a sizeable group terming itself Gay and Lesbian Irish to join the parade have been fiercely resisted by the local Irish Catholic hierarchy and the majority of the selfconsciously 'Irish-American' population: as if to say that if you are gay or lesbian, ipso facto, you can not possibly be 'really' Irish.